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THE REVERSAL OF SHAKMAN: IS IT ALSO A
RETURN TO THE SPOILS?
The word patronage is synonymous with American government
and politics,' especially at the local level. Despite the presence of
civil statutes,' patronage has continued to thrive in the 1970s and
1980s. The federal judiciary, however, began an assault on the patronage system in two United States Supreme Court cases3 and in
1. Patronage is defined as "the allocation of discretionary favors of government
in exchange for political support." M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, TO THE VICTOR 5 (1971).
Political parties at any level of government utilize patronage to enforce party discipline. Id. at 299. Probably the most well-known form of patronage is found at the
local level. At the heart of its operations is a political organization informally called a
"machine." Rakove, Observations and Reflections on the Current and Future Directions of the Chicago Democratic Machine, in THE MAKING OF THE MAYOR 127-28 (M.
Holli and P. Green eds. 1984). That organization is made up of three elements. First,
there are the ward committeemen and precinct workers. Id. Second, there are city
and county governments. Id. Finally, there are the private sector groups consisting of
big business, labor unions, financial institutions, and churches. Id.
The machine uses a number of patronage forms in order to subsidize itself. One
form of political patronage is granting public jobs in exchange for political support.
See M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, supra, at 5. However, there are other lucrative forms
as well, such as the award of construction contracts and investment of government
funds in favored financial institutions. Id. at 6.
2. The federal government passed its first civil service legislation in 1883 with
the Pendleton Act, ch. 27, § 1, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp.
II 1982)). The State of Illinois passed its first such act on March 20, 1895. OFFICE OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CHICAGO CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 5

(1896) [hereinafter CIVIL

SERVICE REPORT]. The Act established a Civil Service Commission to regulate the civil service activities of Illinois municipalities. Id. It was intended to eliminate the burden of numerous applicants badgering government administrators for jobs. Id. at 7. In addition, the Act was created to relieve city workers
from the "unfair burden of political assessments." Id.
The civil service statute also applied to the City of Chicago. CIVIL SERVICE REPORT, supra, at 5. However, history portrays Chicago government and civil service
ideologies as contradictions in terms. Some have called the City the "patronage capital of the world" despite the presence of the civil service act. See M. TOLCHIN & S.
TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 27.
From its very beginning, Chicago challenged these civil service principles. Kingsbury, The Merit System in Chicago from 1895 to 1915: The Administration of the
Civil Service Law Under Various Mayors, 4 PUBLIC PERSONNEL STUDIES 154 (1926).
In an effort to get the legislation passed, state congressmen had to grant a 90-day
grace period before the Act became effective. Id. This allowed the Mayor (at that
time, Republican George Swift) the opportunity "to remove his political enemies and
install his friends." Id. The City Council opposed it as well. They drafted a resolution
declaring that the Council had "no sympathy with the so-called civil service law and
with the manner in which it ha[d] been enforced." Id. at 155.
3. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (refined and reinforced the Supreme
Court's decision in Elrod); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (Supreme Court found
the practice of discharging government workers for political reasons violated the employees' constitutional rights).
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two federal district court decrees." This assault was aimed at eliminating the politically motivated firing and hiring of government employees.' However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
took a massive step backwards in the case of Shakman v. Dunne,'
which set aside a district court decision that prohibited political
7
hiring.
This antipatronage litigation has a tortured history. It began
when Michael Shakman was defeated in his bid for a seat in the
1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention.' Convinced that his loss was
due to the massive political base built and maintained by the Cook
County Democratic Organization, 9 Shakman and one of his political
supporters filed suit in 1969, alleging that his rights as a candidate,
and the rights of those voters who supported him, were stymied by
the Democratic Organization."0
Initially, the district court dismissed Shakman's complaint on
the ground that he lacked standing to attack the patronage practices
of the Democratic Organization and local political entities.1 But
For a synthesis of the Elrod and Branti decisions, see MOELLER, The Supreme
Court's Quest For Fair Politics, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 203, 213-19
(1984); Comment, First Amendment Limitations On Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (1982).
4. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 569 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (prohibited government from using political considerations when hiring employees); Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1356-59
(N.D. Ill. 1979), vacated, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987) (Consent Judgment entered
May 5, 1972) (prohibiting defendant governments dismissing employees for political
reasons).
5. See supra notes 3 and 4 for an explanation of the federal court decisions.
6. 829 F. 2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1026 (1988). The
United States Supreme Court has let this decision stand without comment. Chicago
Daily L. Bull., Feb. 22, 1988, at 1, col. 13.
7. Shakman v. Dunne effectively overruled Shakman v. Democratic Org. of
Cook County, 569 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
8. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 310 F. Supp. 1398, 1399 (N.D.
I11.1969). Shakman was an independent candidate, i.e., a candidate not endorsed by
any particular political party. Id. at 1398.
9. Id.
10. Id. Shakman did not limit himself to suing the Democratic Organization of
Cook County. Rather, he either originally named or eventually added 42 local, county
and state government agencies and the Republican County Central Committee of
Cook County as the defendants to his suit.
It should be noted that Shakman and one of his political supporters, Paul Lurie,
sued individually and on behalf of all other candidates, voters, and taxpayers similarly situated. The taxpayer cause of action, however, was eventually dismissed. See
Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (N.D. Ill.
1979), vacated, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987).
11. Shakman, 481 F. Supp. at 1403. The case was originally assigned to District
Court Judge Abraham Marovitz. Id. at 1399. Ironically, Marovitz himself was a product of patronage, having risen through the state's attorney's office, state legislature,
and finally the federal court on numerous political endorsements, including the backing of Richard J. Daley. McClory, Shakman: the man and his battle against patronage, Illinois Issues, Sept. 1983, at 7-12.
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upon appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Shakman was found to have
stated a cause of action appropriate for the district court to review. 2
At last, the judicial door was open and Shakman stepped in.
Shakman's strategy was two-fold. First, he mounted a campaign
against the Democratic Machine 3 and local and county government
agencies, 4 challenging their practice of firing government employees
for political reasons." Shakman and other candidates similarly situated faced "insurmountable odds for independent candidates in
view of the fact that such candidates cannot match either the funds
or campaign hours derived from patronage employees."' 6
In 1972, the plaintiffs and numerous defendants negotiated a
consent decree that prohibited the firing of government employees
for political reasons.' The judicially approved decree, now known as
Shakrman I, also banned employees from engaging in partisan activities during their regular work hours."8 Finally, the district court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of considering the legality of hiring government employees for political reasons.' i
12. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970).
The court found that "it is clear that at least some aspect of the interests of candidates in an equal chance and of the interests of voters in having an equally effective
voice are rights secured from state action by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 270.
13. The Democratic Party has had a colorful history in Cook County. That
party has controlled the Mayor's Office in the City of Chicago since 1931. ZiKMUND,
Mayoral Voting and Ethnic Politics in the Daley-Bilandic-Byrne Era, in AFTER
DALEY: CHICAGO POLITICS IN TRANSITION 31 (1982). The then Mayor, Alton Cermak,
has been credited for establishing the Chicago machine whose reputation was fully
developed during the "reign" of Richard J. Daley. Id. This Democratic machine has
historically been a very powerful entity, not only controlling the Mayor's Office, but
controlling or influencing numerous other county, state and national positions. Id.
For an observation on the history and prospects for the Cook County Democratic
Machine, see Rakove, Observations and Reflections on the Current and Future Directions of the Chicago Democratic Machine, in THE MAKING OF THE MAYOR 127-28
(M. Holli & P. Green eds. 1984).
14. See supra note 10 for an explanation of who the defendants were in the
Shakman litigation.
15. Shakman, 356 F. Supp. at 1243. Shakman asserted that the Democratic Machine built its own voting base through the work forces of the local government entities. Id. In return for political support and votes, the Machine would reward these
supporters with government jobs. Id. Then, they would effectively retain the employees' support using the threat of loss of employment. Id.
16. Id.
17. The plaintiffs negotiated an agreement banning politically motivated discharges of government employees which was subsequently approved in the form of a
judicial order. Its text can be found in Shakman, 481 F. Supp. at 1356-59 (Consent
Judgment entered May 5, 1972). The defendants later challenged portions of that
order in Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 356 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill.
1972). Specifically, the decree prohibited the defendants from "conditioning, basing,
or knowingly prejudicing or affecting any term or aspect of governmental employment, with respect to one who is at the time already a governmental employee, upon
any political reason." Shakman, 481 F. Supp. at 1358 (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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The attack on patronage hiring was the second phase of
20
Shakman's strategy. In a decision commonly called Shakman 11,21
the district court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the practice of hiring governmental employees harmed the plaintiffs' interests as candidates and voters.2 2 At stake were the candidates' interest in political expression, the interests of both candidates and
voters in the freedom of association, and the voters' interest in equal
participation in the electoral process. 28 The Machine's practice of
hiring a massive number of employees for political reasons effectively prohibited the plaintiffs from exercising their own first
amendment rights of expression and association. 24 This decision led
to additional negotiations and the 1983 consent decree.25
Some of the defendants chose to challenge each step of the
Shakman litigation.26 Others, such as the City of Chicago, voluntarily signed the Shakman H decree. 27 In so assenting, those entities
agreed to develop a plan of compliance that would explain how the
government entity would hire its work force without using political
20. The court found that there were approximately 250 government workers per
ward in Chicago who needed Democratic sponsorship as the basis of obtaining public
employment. Shakman, 481 F. Supp. 1325. There are 50 such wards in the City of
Chicago. To get this sponsorship, potential public employees generally had to perform some type of political work, such as working in a precinct, working in support of
the Democratic Party, or switching their political affiliation to Democratic. Id.
21. The actual decree, known as Shakman II, is found in Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 569 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The judicial decision
that discusses the defendants' defenses against the enforcement of this decree is
found in Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
22. Shakman, 481 F. Supp. at 1332.
23. Id. These interests, the court found, are embodied and protected in the first
and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 1332-35. The defendants were found to have intentionally used the powers of their offices and the work forces to effectively impede
the candidacies of citizens like Shakman. Id. at 1333. "[A] plaintiff's interest in running for . . . [public office] . . . and thereby expressing his political views without
interference from state officials who wished to discourage the expressions of those
views lies at the core of the values protected by the First Amendment." Id. (citing
Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977)).
Newcomb dealt with a public employee who was dismissed allegedly because he chose
to run for a government office. Unfortunately for plaintiff Newcomb, he occupied a
policy-making position and the court found his dismissal justified.
24. Shakman, 481 F. Supp. at 1332-35.
25. Specifically, the 1983 judgment prohibited the defendants from "conditioning, basing, or affecting the hiring of Governmental Employees upon any political
reason or factor." Shakman, 569 F. Supp. at 179 (emphasis added).
26. The following agencies filed immediate appeals after the 1983 judgment and
continued to challenge the litigation up until the latest decision in 1987: Board of
Commissioners of Cook County; Forest Preserve of Cook County; Cook County Clerk;
Assessor of Cook County; and the Democratic Party Cook County Organization.
Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F. 2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1026
(1988).
27. The City of Chicago decided to sign its own consent decree separate from
the other defendants. It is found in Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 569
F. Supp. at 186-90 [hereinafter Chicago Judgment].
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considerations.28 These guidelines would then receive judicial scrutiny before going into effect. 9
Using the City of Chicago as an example, the process of developing an apolitical hiring system was a massive project. 80 Prior to
Shakman II, the City's hiring policies were very general and quite
nebulous, thereby allowing the current administration to bypass the
system easily and often.' 1 After intensive study, a step-by-step hir-

ing manual was drafted. 82 It stressed the use of objective hiring criteria and prohibited any reliance on a job candidate's political
allegiance."
Not all government agencies were as willing as the City of Chicago to embrace the sound philosophy of Shakman II." Those agencies chose to continue their fight, taking the issue once again to the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit." In 1987, with one drastic
decision, the appellate court struck down the district court decision
that had banned patronage hiring."6 The court effectively placed
Chicago-area politics back to the 1960s, signaling to all local governments that political hiring was an acceptable way to build a public
work force.
In rethinking the principles of Shakman II, the court of appeals
reconsidered the issue of the plaintiffs' standing.' In 1970, this
28. Shakman, 569 F. Supp. at 180. The Shakman II decree, however, did not
completely ban patronage firing or hiring. Rather, the judgment recognized that there
are certain confidential or policy-making positions where political affiliation is appropriate when making employment decisions. See id. at 182. The court initially determined which positions were exempt. Id. at 183. However, the court allowed the defendant agency to petition the court to ask for additional "Shakman-exempt"
positions. Id. at 182.
29. Id. The district court retained jurisdiction to not only oversee the development of the hiring plans but also to hear complaints related to the violation of those
plans. Id.
30. Not only was it a massive project to completely revise the City's hiring
guidelines, but the district court only granted the City 120 days to develop the Plan
of Compliance. Chicago Judgment, supra note 27, at 187.
31. The individual City departments exercised their own discretion in the hiring
of their employees with little central oversight from the City's personnel department.
CITY OF CHICAGO PERSONNEL RULES, Rule VII, § 5 (1980). The Department of Personnel's functions in the area of hiring were basically limited to the administration of

employment tests, id. Rule VI, § 1, and maintaining lists of employees who passed
those tests. Id. Rule VII, § 1.
32. The City's Department of Personnel coordinated this study with the help of
a consulting staff from Arthur Anderson. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook
County, No. 69 C 2145, at 3 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (1984 Annual Report).

33. CITY OF CHICAGO, DETAILED HIRING PROVISIONS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE
SHAKMAN JUDGMENT (August 20, 1986). These provisions effectively placed the Department of Personnel as the entity responsible for ensuring that the City complies
with the judgment. Id. at 1-2.
34. See supra note 26 for a list of these agencies.
35. Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1392-99.
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same court found that the plaintiffs had stated a genuine cause of
action.88 But, in 1987, the court changed positions and concluded
that this determination had been improper due to more recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the case-and-controversy provision
found in Article III of the Constitution. 9 Those decisions, the appellate court continued, mandated that it reverse the district court's
findings in Shakman 11.40

The court began its analysis by referring to Allen v. Wright, 1 a
recent Supreme Court case that enunciated a comprehensive test for
determining whether a plaintiff has met the constitutional requirement of proper standing.' 2 That test stated that "a plaintiff must
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."4' 8 The Seventh Circuit, in applying this test, found the "fairly
traceable" connection between the plaintiffs' injury and the defendants' conduct missing." In essence, the court refused to acknowledge
that the patronage hiring of thousands of government employees affected the constitutional rights of candidates and voters in any tenable way.
Although the court stated that the indirectness of an injury
does not automatically bar one's standing in federal court, 5 it found
that in Shakman's case, the indirectness was fatal. 46 The court
stated that there are "countless individual decisions [that] depend
upon

. . .

countless individual political assessments that those who

are in power will stay in power.'' For example, the court found that
it was not the hiring policy itself that created an advantage to the
incumbent administration, but rather the decision of the incumbent
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the basis of the
cause of action.
39. Shakman, 829 F. 2d at 1393. The circuit court found that since 1970, when
this court originally held that the plaintiffs did have standing and stated a cause of
action, the United States Supreme Court had reexamined the issue of justiciability.
Id. This reexamination, the circuit court explained, had the effect of limiting the federal courts' ability to find a case-and-controversy requirement mandated in the Constitution. Id.
40. Id.
41. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
42. Id. at 751.
43. Id.
44. Shakman, 829 F.2d at 1397-99.
45. Id. at 1396. The court noted that where government places some type of
prohibition on one party that causes harm to a third party, the third party is not
automatically barred from bringing suit solely on the basis of this indirectness. Id.
The court, however, did point out that this indirectness often makes it difficult to
substantiate the constitutionally required causal connection between the defendant's

acts and the indirect injury. Id.
46. Shakman, 829 F.2d at 1397.
47. Id.
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to use a patronage policy.'"
The court of appeals ignored the true basis of the plaintiffs'
complaint. While the court directed its attention to the political environment in general, the court failed to address the true defendant
in this case-the Democratic Machine. In Cook County, the Machine has enjoyed a history of documented success not only in retaining its personnel in high-level positions throughout the county,
but also in effecting the election of many new Democrats throughout
the state.' 9 Shakman challenged these practices in Cook County,
rather than challenging the political environment of the entire state.
Shakman, as a candidate, did suffer an injury fairly traceable to
the actions of both the defendant Democratic Organization and government agencies that used patronage hiring to build its ranks of
loyal supporters. Shakman lost his quest for a seat on the constitutional committee because he did not have the resources to challenge
the patronage-built monolith known as the Democratic Machine. He
had no real opportunity to freely associate with government workers
who owed their jobs to the Democratic party. Voters, too, who tried
to support the independents such as Shakman, found their votes
meaningless when cast against the bulwark of Machine voters. The
48. Id. The court also enumerated other variables that could determine the nature and extent of a citizen's political activity. Id. The court stated that these factors
are contingent upon the nature of the political environment. Id. In some political
arenas, the practice of patronage hiring by the incumbent administration may enjoy a
great deal of credibility with potential workers. Id. The incumbent may be able to
point to a successful track record that shows their ability to successfully implement
policies. Id. In other words, where an incumbent administration has been successful,
patronage jobs are desirable and through the practice of granting government jobs for
political support, an administration can build its voting base.
On the other hand, if the political environment was hostile to the incumbent,
these patronage jobs would no longer appeal to the citizen. Id. Stated differently, the
incumbent's patronage policy would be of no consequence because citizens would not
be motivated to vote for the unsuccessful administration regardless of the opportunity to receive a government job. Hence, the court found the political environment so
full of changing factors that the plaintiffs could not successfully trace their injury to
the defendants' conduct. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs did not meet the case-and-controversy requirement. Id.
This argument is fatally flawed. The court fails to recognize that pre-Shakman
hiring policies throughout Cook County governmental agencies were subjective and
unstructured at best. They were apparently designed with the purpose of promoting
patronage-based hiring practices. For example, in the City of Chicago, there was no
central oversight of the hiring activities, which left the individual City departments
the discretion to hire however they saw fit. See supra note 31. The Chicago Park
District as well bad a very unstable hiring policy that allowed the district to hire
"temporary" employees by the hundreds and thus avoid what hiring policies were
actually in place. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 6. Finally, the clearest
example of patronage hiring policies left completely unchecked is found at the Chicago Transit Authority. The CTA, which for some unknown reason was not a named
defendant in the Shakman suit, has absolutely no written hiring policies at all.
49. See supra note 13 for some readings on the history and success of the Democratic Party in Cook County.
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court would not, and did not, recognize that these two groups stated
any cognizable injury traceable to the defendants' political activities.
Additionally, the defendants only challenged the district court's
ban on political hiring, thus leaving the earlier Shakman I decision
intact. It is inconceivable how one form of patronage-based personnel practices can remain constitutionally prohibited while another
similar form is clearly acceptable. In essence, the court held that an
administration that is victorious at the polls can hire its own supporters but cannot remove supporters of the previous administration. This inconsistency only serves to encourage the proliferation of
the bureaucracy because the court completely avoided ruling on the
validity of politically motivated hiring.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's decision has prompted the area's
largest government employer to challenge the validity of the consent
decree it entered into voluntarily in 1983.50 The City of Chicago
hopes to rid itself of the detailed hiring guidelines that were developed as the means to implement Shakman H." Further, the Mayor
of Chicago has stated that the city wishes to annul the Shakman
decree to avoid paying the legal fees that were awarded to the plaintiffs.52 This same tactic of fee avoidance, however, provides the opportunity for the return of the same patronage practices that
plagued the city through the bulk of its history.
The total return to pre-Shakman political days must stop here.
The court of appeals must not allow the City to escape a decree that
it voluntarily signed. If the decree is lifted, the City will revert to
the patronage hiring of yesteryear. One need only look to other local
government agencies where Shakman was either lightly applied or
not applied at all. Those agencies, such as the park district, transit
authority, and housing authority, use patronage hiring on a fullscale basis.5 3
For example, the Chicago Park District has recently been heralded as the pinnacle of modern-day patronage." ' The General Su50.

Chicago Tribune, Feb. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 6.

51. Id.
52. Id. The Mayor of Chicago also stated that the City is still committed to the
concepts of Shakman II. Id. However, it is dubious that the City would initiate a
similar plan, or even keep the present Plan of Compliance guidelines. Throughout the
history of Cook County politics, patronage has remained on the forefront. And

through this history, no one attempted or desired to end the benefits that came with
patronage. For the current City administration to act on its own to strip itself of this
benefit stretches the imagination to the point of unbelievability.
53. See supra note 48 for examples of unchecked patronage hiring practices of
local government agencies.
54. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 6. According to the article, a recent
study was conducted by the Civic Federation, a local good-government group, who
found "patronage [at an] all-time high under the [current park district] administration, who had taken [charge] with a pledge to reform the traditional job-rich haven."
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perintendent uses politically based hiring practices to build a work
force loyal to him and his supporters.5 The General Superintendent
rewards individuals who join his campaign with high-level positions,
paying little or no concern to the individual's qualifications." Citizens interested in reforming the park district face insurmountable
odds when confronted with the machine-style politics that the Seventh Circuit now permits.
The same picture may soon be painted for the City of Chicago if
the appellate court continues its assault against the sound principles
of the Shakman decrees. Candidates and voters will once again face
machine-style politics at the polls. As in the past, many candidates
will be unsuccessful and their constitutional rights to associate with
whom they choose will be trammeled. The electorate's right to equal
representation at the polls will again disappear. Machine politics
have never taken into account those types of rights. By prohibiting
patronage hiring and firing, partisan politics in Cook County is not
banned. Rather, it merely provides the opportunity for candidates
and voters, who represent all political factions, to participate equally
in the electoral process.
Linda K. Horras

Id. The study's results showed that in actuality, 64% of the park district staff were
categorized as temporary employees who had received their jobs through direct appointments and had never taken civil service examinations, which were required by
statute. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.

